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There is a mounting discontent in Europe about the conduct of macroeconomic 
policy in the euro area and especially its policy mix, in the broad sense of the term 
– the combination of monetary policy, fiscal policy and structural reforms. If the 
proof of the pudding is in the eating, the weak economic performances of the euro 
area since 2001 is a testimony that some thing has gone wrong with the reaction of 
public policies to the financial, confidence and geopolitical shocks which have hit 
the world economy. In the three years period – 2001-2003 – the average growth 
rate of the zone would be of about 1%, and the forecast for 2004 is not that of a 
bright rebound, but of a soft recovery (1.8%). Of course, one can argue that we 
should not expect from economic policies more than they can deliver. They act at 
the margin, and they can’t prevent much of the consequences of, say, the 
explosion of a financial bubble which will go its way through the private sector, 
policy reactions notwithstanding.
The actors in the policy debate held different views which may be expressed in a 
sketchy way as follows. The monetary policy authorities think that the 
responsibilities lie with the governments (bad management of fiscal policies of 
which high budget deficits are a consequences), and the resistance of societies to 
structural reforms. The governments think that they lie with the central bank 
(delayed and weak responses to shocks) and also with societies (the difficulty to 
implement reforms). The average citizen think that all actors have a share of 
responsibilities: fiscal and monetary authorities by not reacting enough, and the 
private sector by opposing reforms and/or by trying to escape the burden of 
adjustment to shocks.
In a nutshell each actor reproaches to the others to be insufficiently flexible, if by 
flexibility we mean the capacity to adjust quickly to new informations. And all of 
21 See Fitoussi 2002a
2 I did so at length in, La règle et le choix, Seuil 2002.
them are rights, but in a different degree. In a former briefing paper1, I tried to 
show how the stability pact should be reinterpreted to allow for a greater degree of 
“flexibility” of fiscal authorities. Here, I will focus on structural reforms and the 
new ECB’s monetary strategy. 
Structural reforms
The plea for structural reforms is twofold: they will allow the economy to operate 
at a higher degree of activity; they will increase the self regulatory functioning of a 
market economy, reducing the scope and the need for macroeconomic policies. 
The reference model describes an economy with perfect competition and rational 
expectations. In such a model full employment is always a characteristic of the 
temporary equilibrium, and rational expectations lead to the ineffectiveness of 
monetary policy. Hence the central bank should focus on price stability and can 
achieve it at no costs if it is credible. Departures from perfect competition will 
increase the equilibrium rate of unemployment, without giving to the central bank 
the opportunity to act to reduce it, but with mounting pressures from governments 
and societies towards the bank so as it acts in a more expansionary manner. If the 
bank succumbs to this pressures, the result would be an acceleration of inflation. 
The reasons is simply that markets imperfections lead to an increase in the non 
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU).
This framework lead to emphasize the role of institutions in economic 
performances, especially labour market institutions. These institutions lead to 
diverse rigidities which explain the departures from the reference model and bad 
economic outcomes. This vision has two major (and related) flaws: The first is 
that it is based on a simplistic application of the welfare theorems, by which a 
perfectly competitive market will always reach the most efficient price/quantity 
allocation. It is simplistic because the step from the theoretical result to the policy 
prescription is wider than one could think, and has to be taken cautiously (as was 
done by the founders of general equilibrium theory). First, even assuming that 
market forces were able to attain the maximum efficiency, there would still exist a 
problem of equity in the distribution of the resources. A democratic society may 
have a legitimate taste for redistribution and for the implementation of a costly 
system of safety nets; in this case the strict optimality notion delivered by the free 
market ideology may not coincide with a broader notion of social welfare, as the 
democratic process may lead the society to trade some of the efficiency in favour 
of higher social cohesion. Furthermore, it may be argued2 (Fitoussi 2002b) that 
democracy and political adhesion of the population to the economic government 
of a society can actually enhance efficiency, guaranteeing the flexibility, 
transparency and consensus that would be missing when ruling according to the 
strict application of a doctrine. In this sense, the political process and the market 
would be complements rather than substitutes. This complementarity is even more 
striking when we realize that the efficiency of the market outcome strongly 
3depends on a number of assumptions that are rarely observed in the real world, 
from perfect competition to complete markets and information. The long and 
widely studied list of "market failures" gives a scope for public intervention that 
may not be overlooked only because we also observe "government failures". In 
particular, a number of institutional rigidities that we observe in the European 
labour markets can be explained by the different bargaining power of workers and 
entrepreneurs. In its Wealth of Nations Smith had already highlighted the 
problems that this asymmetry could cause. The norms on labour protection can 
then be seen as a legitimate outcome of the democratic process, aimed at re-
establishing some fairness in the bargaining process. The following paragraphs 
will tackle, more in detail, the debate on institutions and labour market 
performance.
The influence of institutions, especially labour market institutions, on labour 
market performances has been a long debated question at least since the twenties. I 
remember a paper by Jacques Rueff published in 1931, whose title was self 
explaining: “Unemployment insurance cause of persistent unemployment”, in 
which the author was trying to explain the increase in unemployment in the 
twenties in the United Kingdom. Simple correlations convinced him that there was 
no other cause of the evolution of unemployment in that country. Of course we 
have done a lot of technical progress in dealing with data since then, but that the 
question is still debated today shows that almost a century of hard and rigorous 
research has been unable to settle the debate.
According to most studies of which the one realized by Stephen Nickell and 
associates (2003) is representative “the equilibrium level of unemployment is 
affected first by any variables which influences the ease with which unemployed 
individuals can be matched to available job vacancies, and second, by any variable 
which tend to raise wages in a direct fashion despite excess supply in the labour 
market”. These variables includes the unemployment benefit system, the real 
interest rate, employment protection, active labour market policy, union structures, 
the extent of coordination in wage bargaining, labour taxes etc..(terms of trade, 
shifts in trend productivity growth). But it is fair to say that until now, there is no 
convincing evidence that labour market institutions are responsible for the high 
level of unemployment in continental Europe or the disappointing macroeconomic 
performances of Europe during the nineties. What is striking is the weak, to say 
the least, explanatory power of the institutional variables, especially those 
considered as being the more important, namely the benefit replacement rate and 
employment protection. That the latter may have ambiguous effects has long been 
recognized in the literature: the fact that firms are more cautious about hiring, 
because of strong labor protection may increase the efficiency of the matching 
process. But what has not been recognized is that the same may be said for the 
workers. The fact that unemployment benefit allows the unemployed to search for 
a job better suited to their skills and expectations, may also increase the efficiency 
of the matching process. Certainly labor productivity could be greater if the 
worker has the feeling that his job is corresponding better to his desire (Fitoussi 
2003). There is thus a hiatus between usual recommendations and the weaknesses 
of the evidence to support them. At best empirical studies are able to explain 
43 See Fitoussi, Jestaz, Phelps, Zoega (2000).: “Roots of the recent recoveries: labor reforms sound 
public finance or private sector forces?, Brookings papers on economic activity
4 See Krugman (1994) on this point : “Competitiveness: a dangerous obsession”, Foreign Affairs. 
73(2): 28-44.
5 See Cohen and Saint-Paul (1997) discuss the case of employment protection. “French 
Unemployment: translatlantic perspective”, Economic Policy 25:267-91.
6 See Fitoussi, Passet (2000) : “Réduction du chômage: les réussites en Europe”, Conseil 
d’Analyse Economique 23, La Documentation Française ; and Freeman (2000) : “Single peaked vs 
diversified capitalism: the relation between economic institutions and outcomes, NBER Working 
Paper 7556.
second order of importance effects of institutions on unemployment.
Economic outcomes are more easily explained by the big shocks that OECD 
countries have suffered: changing trend in productivity growth, the oil shocks, the 
important increase in the real rate of interest. Besides, structural reforms in the 
countries which implemented them, do not appear to have played an important 
role either3.
This is why a new empirical strategy has been developed which consists to study 
the interaction between shocks and institutions (Cf. e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 
2000, or Fitoussi and Phelps, 2001). Institutions which may be innocuous in 
normal time can matter in case of shocks, because they prevent adaptation to these 
shocks. There are two reasons why the interaction strategy seems more appealing. 
First unemployment rates in the OECD countries had risen roughly in unison from 
the mid-seventies to the mid 1980s. Thus all the favoured candidates to explain 
the phenomenon are OECD-wide shocks. Second labour-market institutions may 
have mainly played a role in propagating these shocks rather than originating the 
shocks4. The welfare state had its origins well before the rise in unemployment at 
the beginning of the 1950s when Europe was enjoying low unemployment and 
generally good labour-market performance. 
Moreover, a better understanding of the early shocks that drove unemployment to 
new heights in previous decades in Europe can possibly help save some 
institutions that, by making up for failures in insurance markets and training, may 
be worth keeping. Finally, the institutions reflect a social contract that arises from 
a democratic process. In this process there are winners and losers so structural 
reform is unlikely to lead to a Pareto-improving outcome, even one supported by a 
majority of the electorate5. And former research showed that it is hard to explain 
change in unemployment by change in institutions. 
We come thus to the second flaw of the 'structural reform argument': The 
assumption that the free market paradigm is always superior to any other 
institutional arrangement, an assumption that is not supported by the data, nor by 
common sense. Two recent studies independently conducted on the subject6, 
reached the same conclusion out of a sample of 19 OECD countries. In market 
democracies, the institutional structure is not a powerful factor in explaining 
economic performances. Capitalism is sufficiently robust to accommodate rather 
different institutional settings. That conclusion is at odds with the common 
wisdom according to which the diversity of institutional structures plays a 
57 As Solow remarks at the end of Keynes Lectures: “If pure unadulterated labour-market reform is 
unlikely to create a substantial increase in employment, then the main reason for doing it is 
anticipated gain in productive efficiency, however large that may be. But if we respect the wage 
earner’s desire for job security, and it seems at least as respectable as anyone’s desire for fast cars 
or fat-free desserts, then an improvement in productive efficiency gained that way is not a Pareto-
improvement. More labor market flexibility may still be worth having – and I think it is – but then 
the losers have a claim in equity to some compensation. The trick is to find a form of compensation 
that does not cancel the initial gain in labour-market flexibility.”
determinant role in explaining both unemployment and growth. And indeed 
empirical evidence in favour of such a thesis appears at best very weak. If we had 
in each decade followed common wisdom we would have recommended to every 
countries in the world to follow the French institutional model in the 60s, the 
Japanese one in the seventies, the German one in the eighties, and the US one in 
the 90s. The nationality of the model of the present decade (the years 2000s) is 
still unknown7.
The diversity of the institutional framework in OECD countries shows that 
institutions are the outcome of a political process anchored in the specific history, 
culture and anthropology of the country, rather than a way to increase efficiency. If 
for example, the labour contract which emerged from the world war II was open 
ended and of indefinite duration despite the cultural diversity of the countries 
concerned, it may be just because after a war, the solidarity between social groups 
had to be reassessed. My second remark is thus that there is a strong presumption 
that institutions are endogenous. Structural measures are usually taken to cope 
with a problem, in a sense which is not necessarily the one economists would 
recommend. Rising unemployment in Europe in a period where stabilisation 
policies were aimed at disinflation and at maintaining monetary parities, has lead 
to structural activism to alleviate the pain of the unemployed. There is for example 
in France a clear causal relation between restrictive policies, mounting 
unemployment and the 1997 law on the reduction of working time – the 35 hours 
week. And in the US, the increase in the generosity of employment benefits has 
followed the collapse of financial markets and September 11.
Some active labour market policy have also the (unintended?) effect of putting the 
blame almost uniquely on the side of the workers, who are considered as inclined 
to adopt a passive behaviour when confronted with unemployment or an egoistic 
behaviour when they are insiders. What is striking is that in Europe the advocates 
of orthodox macroeconomic policies ( the stability pact and the single objective 
for monetary policy) are recommending incredibly interventionist structural 
policies which in a way are more limitative of the freedom of people that any kind 
of classical demand policy. 
The ECB’s monetary policy strategy
68 This may be arrived at by summing potential output growth, estimated at 2.5%, the target 
inflation rate, say 1.75%, and a trend shift in velocity of about 0.5% per year. 
They are two readings of the press release about the new ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy. The first, sympathetic, will focus on what seems to be a radical departure 
from the initial strategy taking into account the most voiced criticisms about this 
strategy:
a point target of 2% for the inflation rate, i.e an objective equal to the upper 
bound of the preceding definition: “the governing council agreed that in the 
pursuit of price stability it will aim to maintain inflation rates close to 2% over the 
medium term.” Note that this change represents a real progress in two directions 
with respect to the past. A point target is an unambiguous and symmetric 
definition; and second the target has been chosen at a higher level that the implicit 
target that one could deduct from the reference growth rate of the money supply 
used by the ECB (1.5%). Furthermore the press release lays out the reasons why it 
is so: “This clarification underlines the ECB’s commitment to provide a sufficient 
safety margin to guard against the risks of deflation. It also addresses the issue of 
the possible presence of a measurement bias in the HICP and the implications of 
inflation differentials within the euro area”. Even if the three arguments have not 
the same weight, they all effectively imply an increase in the inflation target. The 
first and the third are linked through the Balassa-Samuelson effect – the 
convergence of price levels between countries with different levels of 
development which implies the persistence of inflation differentials – but also 
because the exchange rate parities at the outset of the launching of the euro were 
characterized for some countries by an overvaluation and for others by an 
undervaluation of their currencies. If the inflation objective is too low, it will thus 
impose on the more developed countries an inflation rate close to zero or even a 
risk of deflation if it happens that the currency of these countries have been 
overvaluated. Germany is obviously a case in point. The second argument, the 
possibility of a measurement bias in the HICP, is quite distinct as it has better to 
be clarified the soonest possible. It should require as that has been done in the US 
the establishment of an independent committee to review the question and to 
suggest new methods of measurement. 
The two-pillar monetary-policy strategy is de facto evolving towards a one pillar 
strategy, through the downgrading of the first pillar (the money supply M3).  As 
was underlined in my last briefing paper, the ECB has been following until now, 
at least in theory, the strategy called of the "two pillars", heritage of the 
compromises that underlie its creation; on one side, it was supposed to target 
money growth ( the “reference value” is 4.5% per year8); on the other hand, it had 
to take into account a composite indicator of inflationary pressures. In practice, the 
money growth objective was not followed, and the ECB simply focussed on the 
second pillar. But this ambiguity between the strategy the Bank was supposed to 
follow and the one it actually implemented, was a nuisance for the transparency of 
its acts, the effectiveness of its communication strategy, and finally damaged the 
ECB in its quest for credibility. The flaw with the first pillar has been extensively 
analysed in the many reports by the ECB watcher group and practically by all 
economists who have evaluated the strategy. The change is thus welcome. “The 
Governing Council wishes to clarify communication on the cross-checking of 
7information in coming to its unified judgement on the risks to price stability. 
To this end, the introductory statement … will start with the economic 
analysis to identify short to medium-term risks to price stability …. The 
Governing Council also decided to no longer conduct a review of the reference 
value on an annual basis.”  All that amounts to say that the money supply will 
play almost no role in the decisions for setting the interest rate, although it 
may be taken into consideration as one of the numerous elements allowing to 
assess the risks to price stability. The fact that monetary analysis may be useful 
to assess medium to long term trend in inflation is not really under dispute, nor 
is it essential to fix short term interest rates. 
One may conclude from this first, sympathetic reading, of the press communiqué 
that in changing its strategy in this way, the ECB has proven its capacity to ear 
well grounded criticisms and thus that it is much more pragmatic that one would 
like us to believe. If this interpretation is correct, then the new strategy would 
allow for a more “flexible” monetary policy, i.e. both more reactive and more 
proactive. 
There is though a second reading of the press release, pointing to its contradictions 
(see e.g. Paul de Grauwe: “The central bank that has missed the point”, The 
Financial Times, May 13, 2003), and to its omissions. There is in effect a 
contradiction in the press communiqué as far as the definition of price stability is 
concerned. The Governing Council begin by confirming the definition which it 
announced in 1998, namely “price stability is defined as a year-on-year increase in 
the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%.” 
And it is after this confirmation that the new definition that I considered as a point 
target of 2% followed. How can we reconcile this two definitions, the first being 
asymmetric, the second symmetric. For Paul de Grauwe, “instead of creating 
clarity, the ECB has managed to create confusion about its true intention.” That is 
unfortunate, as a pragmatic move may be interpreted as an incapacity to decide 
about such fundamental a point as a final objective of economic policy. How the 
markets could anticipate monetary policy if it is not sure about the objective the 
ECB is pursuing? The Committee of economic and monetary affairs of the 
European parliament should ask for more clarity in its next hearing of the 
president of the ECB. The omissions concern mainly the other ingredients of an 
inflation targeting procedure, as has been repeatedly emphasized in a number of 
briefing papers, especially those of  Svensson. According to Christopher Sims 
(2003), “economists should recognize that they have a history of proposing simple 
“nominal anchor” prescriptions for monetary policy that have eventually proved 
not to be very useful.” So we should not consider inflation targeting as The deus 
ex machina which always and everywhere will lead to a correct monetary policy. It 
is an improvement because it enhances goal and model transparency which is by 
itself desirable both for efficiency and democratic reasons. The other omission 
concerns the ways the ECB would participate to the pursuit of other objectives of 
economic policy according to its mandate. After all almost nobody expect that the 
inflation rate could be significantly higher than 2% in the two years to come, that 
is we are in a situation were the participation of the bank to the other objectives of 
the government will not prejudice its primary objective. So according to its statute 
it has to act. 
8But these clarifications can’t perhaps be made in a press release, and we should 
await the first implementation of the new strategy and the reading of future 
monthly bulletins.   
Concluding remarks and summary
In the policy debate, each actor is reproaching to the others a lack of 
“flexibility”. The stability pact reduce the reactivity of fiscal authorities, as has 
been emphasized in my December 2002 briefing paper. In this briefing paper I 
focus on the ECB and structural reforms.
 
The “new” ECB’s monetary policy strategy represents a real progress. First the 
objective for price stability becomes a point target of 2% for the inflation rate, i.e. 
it is symmetric and higher than the implicit target of the former strategy. Second 
the two-pillar monetary strategy is de facto evolving towards a one pillar 
strategy, through the downgrading of the first pillar (the money supply). One may 
only regret that the press communiqué contains also the old definition of price 
stability witch can lead to some confusions. If one disregard the contradiction in 
the press release regarding the inflation objective the new strategy could allow 
for a more flexible monetary policy, that is both more reactive and more 
proactive.
For several years the ECB has been advocating structural reforms implying that 
they would have a decisive impact on price levels and on growth potential, 
through an increase in flexibility. I developed the argument along two lines. The 
first is that the theoretical argument in favour of structural reforms, notably in 
what concerns the labour market, is weak. It relies on too a simplistic application 
of the welfare theorems, and above all it does not take into account the necessary 
interaction between the democratic process and the market process which is the 
characteristic of a modern capitalistic society. The second is that the long debated 
question of whether labour market institutions affect growth performances and 
unemployment is empirically unsettled. The evidence is often weak, and even when 
institutions seem to explain some features of unemployment, their effect is of a 
second order of importance. Furthermore, capitalism appears from different 
empirical analyses as a flexible system, capable to accommodate different 
institutions at different moments of time. This goes against the tendency to invoke 
a single recipe (structural reforms, reduced role of the government) for each 
country at every time.
The above considerations lead to a strong conclusion: It does not exist a single 
superior institutional arrangement, and more specifically, it is impossible to 
advocate always more flexibility in the name of a technical argument. The role of 
the government in the economy, the balance between efficiency and equity 
considerations, the institutional setting that is given to a society are 
fundamentally political choices; and as such should never be entrusted to a 
technical body.
We should thus better think twice before recommending to governments to change 
9such essential thing as the social contract on the basis of weak, uncertain and 
even contradictory evidences. That does not mean that structural reforms are not 
needed, but that they are much more complex to design and to implement – if one 
wants to avoid adverse effects – that the slogan “be more flexible” would want us 
to believe.
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